Title: Bidding Games on Graphs - In theory and in practice.
When: Tuesday, 19 March 2024 at 1900 hrs (IST)
Abstract:
In a two-player zero-sum graph game, the players move a token
throughout the game, producing an infinite play, which
determines the winner of the game. Bidding games are graph
games in which in each turn, a bidding (auction) determines
which player moves the token: the players have budgets, and in
each turn, both players simultaneously submit the bids that do
not exceed the available budgets. The higher bidder moves the
token, and pays the bid to the lower bidder (called Richman
bidding). The standard solution concept of interest in bidding
games are threshold budgets: the necessary and sufficient
budget for winning the game.
In this survey talk, on the theoretical side, we will explore
discrete bidding games, where the keyword discrete stands for
the bids having a fixed granularity. We obtain membership in NP
∩ coNP for solving parity bidding games with exponentially
succinct representation. This will be followed by our newly
proposed application of bidding games to a decentralized
synthesis problem for multi-objective decision making. Here,
synthesized policies express their scheduling urgency via bids
and a bounded budget guarantees long-run fairness. Moreover,
our proposed solution framework is modular, in the sense that
if one objective changes, we may still combine the policy for
the other objective without having the need to recompute it
from scratch.
These works have been in collaboration with Guy Avni and
Kaushik Mallik.