Coverage-based Greybox Fuzzing as Markov Chain

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TCS Research

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Some of the slides are adapted from Author's presentation.

### Introduction

Fuzz testing is an automated testing technique that uncovers software error by executing the target program with large number of *randomly* generated test inputs.

Three main approaches.

- Black-box fuzzing : Random testing<sup>1</sup>.
- ▶ White-box fuzzing: SAGE <sup>2</sup>.
- Grey-box fuzzing : American Fuzzy Lop <sup>3</sup>.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Miller et al, An empirical study of Unix utilities, CACM, 1990.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Goefroid et al, Automated whitebox fuzz testing, NDSS, 2008.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Zalewski, http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/.


### Grey-box fuzzing


 $\begin{array}{l} \mbox{Black-Box Fuzzing} \rightarrow \mbox{Open Loop Control System}.\\ \mbox{GreyBox Fuzzing} \rightarrow \mbox{Closed Loop Control System}.\\ \mbox{Feedback Function H(s)} \sim \mbox{Branch-Pair Coverage (Pair of consecutive nodes in a CFG)} \end{array}$ 














Id	input	AB	AC	BA	CA	BD	CD	DE	DF
1	"a"		1				1		1
2	"b"	1				1			1
3	"ab"	1	1		1	1			1
	"c"		1				1		1


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







Id	input	AB	AC	BA	CA	BD	CD	DE	DF
1	"a"		1						1
2	"b"	1				1	$  \rangle$		1
3	"ab"	1			1	1			
	"c"		$\left(1\right)$				1		1







Id	input	AB	AC	BA	CA	BD	CD	DE	DF
1	"a"		1				1		1
2	"b"	1				1			1
3	"ab"	1			1	1			1
4	"bb"	2				1			1
5	"aba"	1	2	1	1		1		1
	"abb"	2	1	1	1	1			1

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# Grey-box fuzzing algorithm

Algorithm 1 Grey-box fuzzing algorithm **Require:** Program P, Initial non-crashing seeds  $I_s$ . **Ensure:** Set of crashing inputs  $T_C$  and a tree of test inputs  $T_G$  for P. 1:  $T_{G} = I_{s}$ 2: Run P with  $I_s$  and observe visit counts of branch pairs. 3: repeat 4: t = getNextInput() $\triangleright$  t  $\in$  T<sub>G</sub>. 5: N = assignEnergy(t)6:  $T_m = fuzzTestInput(t, N)$  $\triangleright$   $T_m$  : { $t_{\sigma}$  |  $t_{\sigma} \in MUTATE(t)$ } 7: for all  $t_g \in T_m$  do  $S_{\sigma} = \operatorname{run}(P, t_{\sigma})$ 8: 9: if  $S_g = \bot$  then  $\triangleright$  Did  $t_{g}$  caused a crash or hang ? 10:  $T_C.add(t_g)$ 11: else if isInterestingTestInput $(t_{\sigma}, S_{\sigma})$  then 12:  $T_G.add(t_g)$ ▷ Retain interesting test input 13: end if 14: end for 15: until User interrupt received. 16: return  $(T_G, T_C)$ 

# N = assignEnergy(t)

Let N=100.

Let  $N_1$  be the N \* a factor inversely proportional to  $t_g$ 's execution time.

(Ranging from 0.1 for higher execution time to 3 times for lower execution times) Let  $N_2$  be  $N_1 * a$  factor based on number of branch pairs covered by  $t_g$ .

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(Ranging from 0.25 for lower coverage to 3 times for higher coverage) Let  $N_3$  be  $N_2 * a$  factor based on cycle of  $t_g$ 's discovery and number of time t fuzzed.

(Low = 1 to high = 4) Let  $N_4$  be  $N_3 * a$  factor based on depth of  $t_g$ 's discovery. (Low = 1 to high = 5) return  $N_4$ 

## Problem Statement

```
void crashme (char *s) {
1
23456789
     if(s[0] == 'b')
       if(s[1] == a')
          if(s[2] == 'd')
            if(s[3] == '!')
10
11
                abort() ;
12
  }
```

Listing 1: Program crashes when string s == "bad!"

#### BlackBox Fuzzing

- Assumption : 2<sup>8</sup> characters.
- Expected no. of testcase required to catch the bug : 2<sup>32</sup>.

### Coverage-based GreyBox Fuzzing (CGF)

- Markov Chain modeling of CGF gives the expectation that 2<sup>12</sup> is minimum test required to catch the crash.
- Current CGF algorithms are independent of judicious energy assignment to interesting test vectors for further fuzzing.

# Problem Statement

```
void crashme (char *s) {
 1
2
3
     if(s[0] == 'b')
4
5
       if(s[1] == 'a')
6
 7
          if(s[2] == 'd')
8
9
            if(s[3] == '!')
10
11
                abort() ;
12 }
```

Listing 2: Program crashes when string s == "bad!"

### Objective

Tune energy assignment scheme close to ideal.

#### BlackBox Fuzzing

- Assumption : 2<sup>8</sup> characters.
- Expected no. of testcase required to catch the bug : 2<sup>32</sup>.

#### Coverage-based GreyBox Fuzzing (CGF)

- Markov Chain modeling of CGF gives the expectation that 2<sup>12</sup> tests are required to catch the crash.
- Current CGF algorithms are independent of judicious energy assignment to interesting test vectors for further fuzzing.

- Branch Pair Tuple  $BP_i$ :  $\langle bp_i, C_i \rangle$  where,  $bp_i$  Branch Pair *i*,  $C_i$  Visit Count.
- Path: Sequence of branch pair tuples  $[BP_i, BP_j \dots]$  visited during the execution of the program P on a test vector t.

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Basic Concepts : Probabilistic Modeling

#### Random Variable

Maps possible outcomes from Sample Space to a real valued number.

$$X:\Omega \to \mathbb{R}$$

#### Conditional Probability

Calculates probability of an event happening, given a partial information.

$$P(B|A) = P(B \cap A)/P(A)$$

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#### Stochastic Process

Collection of Random Variables indexed by time.

### Discrete Time Stochastic Process (DTSP)

Sequence of random variables  $X_0$ ,  $X_1$ ,  $X_2$ , . . Denoted by  $\{X_n\}$ . Time: n = 0, 1, 2, . . .

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State Space: m-dimensional vector,  $s = (s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_m)$ Set of all values that the  $X_n$ 's can take.

Also,  $X_n$  takes one of m values, so  $X_n \leftrightarrow s$ .

# Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC)

 $\mathsf{DTSP} \to \mathsf{Discrete\ time\ Markov\ Chain\ (DTMC)\ iff}$ 

$$P[X_{n+1} = j \mid X_n = i_n, ..., X_0 = i_0] = P[X_{n+1} = j \mid X_n = i_n] = P_{ij}(n)$$
(Markovian Property)

#### Markov Property

Future state is independent of the past given the present state is fully known/observable.

 $P_{ij}(n)$ : Probability of transition from state *i* to state *j*, at time *n*. This is also referred as one-step transition probability.

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#### Rat Maze Problem as DTMC




Figure : A rat maze. Allowed transitions are horizontal and vertical neighbors.




Figure : Markov Chain Modeling of Rat Maze Problem

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#### Homogeneous DTMC

 $\mathsf{DTMC}\to\mathsf{Homogeneous}$  iff transition probabilities do not depend on the time n, i.e.

$$P[X_{n+1} = j | X_n = i] = P[X_1 = j | X_0 = i] = P_{ij}.$$

Transition matrix of Homogeneous DTMC  $P = [P_{ij}]_{i,j \in E}$ 

$$P = \begin{pmatrix} p_{1,1} & p_{1,2} & p_{1,3} & p_{1,4} \\ p_{2,1} & p_{2,2} & p_{2,3} & p_{2,4} \\ p_{3,1} & p_{3,2} & p_{3,3} & p_{3,4} \\ p_{4,1} & p_{4,2} & p_{4,3} & p_{4,4} \end{pmatrix}$$

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Coverage-Based Fuzzing as Homogeneous DTMC

Coverage-based Greybox fuzzing can modeled as Timed homogeneous DTMC.

State Space  $S = S^+ + S^-$ .

 $S^+$  - Paths already explored by seeds  $T_G$ .

 $S^-$  - Paths yet to be discovered by fuzzing  $t \in T_G$ .

#### Assumptions :


Probability of exercising path i(undiscovered) from already generated input  $t_j$ , is same as probability of creating test input  $t_j$  from test vectors  $t_i$ .

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
Coverage-based Greybox Fuzzing as Markov Chain



# Example



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


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Coverage-based Greybox Fuzzing as Markov Chain

# Greybox Coverage-based Fuzzing as Markov Chain






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Challenges of Coverage-based Fuzzing

• AFL's power schedule is *constant* in the number of times s(i) the seed has been chosen for fuzzing.




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Challenges of Coverage-based Fuzzing

• AFL's power schedule is *constant* in the number of times s(i) the seed has been chosen for fuzzing.



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# Challenges oCoverage-based Fuzzing

- AFL's power schedule is *constant* in the number of times s(i) the seed has been chosen for fuzzing.
- AFL's power schedule always assigns high energy



Exercises a high-frequency path (rej. inv. PDF)

Greybox

Too much energy assigned to high-frequency paths!

Stationary Distribution and Neighborhood Density

For a time homogeneous DTMC, the vector  $\pi$  is called stationary distribution of MC.

$$\forall j \in S, \ 0 \le \pi_j \le 1.$$

$$1 = \sum_{i \in S} \pi_i.$$

$$\pi_j = \sum_{i \in S} \pi_i * p_{ij}$$

Neighborhood Density of  $\boldsymbol{\pi}$ 

- ► High Density Region :- Set of neighborhood of paths I , where  $\mu_{i \in I}(\pi_i) > \mu_{t_g \in T_G}(\pi_g)$ .
- ► Low Density Region :- Set of neighborhood of paths I , where  $\mu_{i \in I}(\pi_i) < \mu_{t_g \in T_G}(\pi_g)$ .

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 $\mu$  : Arithmetic Mean



# Challenges oCoverage-based Fuzzing

Greybox

- AFL spends too much energy on high-frequency paths.
- We suggest to spend more energy on low-frequency paths and less energy on high-frequency paths.
- We suggest to spend the minimum energy required to discover a new state.

A power schedule manages the energy spent on each state.



# **Power Schedules**

- Constant:  $p(i) = \alpha(i)$ 
  - AFL uses this schedule (fuzzing ~I minute)
  - $\alpha(i)$  .. how AFL judges fuzzing time for the test exercising path i
- Cut-off Exponential:  $p(i) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } f(i) > \mu \\ \min\left(\frac{\alpha(i)}{\beta} \cdot 2^{s(i)}, M\right) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$ 
  - · energy increases exponentially
  - but spend no energy on states in high-density region
  - $\beta > 1 ...$  is a constant
  - s(i) .. #times the input exercising path i has been chosen for fuzzing
  - f(i) .. #fuzz exercising path i (path-frequency)
  - +  $\mu$  .. mean #fuzz exercising a discovered path (avg. path-frequency)
  - M.. maximum energy expendable on a state



# **Power Schedules**

- Exponential:  $p(i) = \min\left(\frac{\alpha(i)}{\beta} \cdot \frac{2^{s(i)}}{f(i)}, M\right)$ 
  - Instead of spending no energy on states in high-density region,
  - · spend energy proportional to the density for the state's region

• Cut-off Exponential: 
$$p(i) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } f(i) > \mu \\ \min\left(\frac{\alpha(i)}{\beta} \cdot 2^{s(i)}, M\right) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

- energy increases exponentially
- but spend no energy on states in high-density region
- $\beta > 1 ...$  is a constant
- + s(i) .. #times the input exercising path i has been chosen for fuzzing
- f(i) .. #fuzz exercising path i (approx. the page rank of i)
- +  $\mu$  .. mean #fuzz exercising a discovered path
- M.. maximum energy expendable on a state

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# Experiments


- Binutils (nm, objdump, strings, size, cxxfilt)
  - it is a difficult subject because it takes program binaries as input.
  - vulnerabilities exist in GDB, Valgrind, Gcov and other libbfd-based tools.
  - attacker might modify a binary such that it becomes malicious upon analysis!
    - e.g., during scan for malicious software or during reverse engineering.

Vulnerability	Туре	
CVE-2016-2226	Exploitable Buffer Overflow	
CVE-2016-4487	Invalid Write due to a Use-After-Free	
CVE-2016-4488	Invalid Write due to a Use-After-Free	
CVE-2016-4489	Invalid Write due to Integer Overflow	i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
CVE-2016-4490	Write Access Violation	We found and
CVE-2016-4491	Various Stack Corruptions	I LLOCO VULVES
CVE-2016-4492	Write Access Violation	reported these
CVE-2016-4493	Write Access Violation	AND use them for
CVE Requested	Stack Corruption	AND USE C
Bug 1	Buffer Overflow (Invalid Read)	our evaluation.
Bug 2	Buffer Overflow (Invalid Read)	10
Bug 3	Buffer Overflow (Invalid Read)	10

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### **Power Schedules**



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# AFLFast @ DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge

- An independent evaluation by team Codejitsu found that AFLFast exposes errors in the benchmark binaries of the DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge 19x faster than AFL.
- In the CGC finals, team Codejitsu placed 5th overall but placed 2nd in terms of Vulnerability Detection (i.e., 2nd highest evaluation score).

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### Questions ?

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# Thank You !

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